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Applying Intermediate Microeconomics to Terrorism
Students expect a microeconomics course to explore the behavior of consumers,
producers, and governments in the marketplace. What they find surprising is how far and wide
the economic theory of choice casts its net in exploring human behavior. In this article we apply
the utility maximization model to terrorists’ resource allocation and targeting behavior and to
governments’ counterterrorism efforts. We also discuss selected game theoretic aspects of
terrorism and counterterrorism. In the conclusion we highlight the benefits of teaching the
economics of terrorism in intermediate microeconomics.
SOME BACKGROUND ON TERRORISM
Definition
There is considerable debate among scholars over how terrorism is to be distinguished
from other forms of violence, such as armed robbery or nation-state warfare (Hoffman 1998, ch.
1). For the purposes of this paper, we adopt Sandler and Hartley’s (1995, 308) definition of
terrorism as “the premeditated use, or threat of use, of extra-normal violence or brutality to gain
a political objective through intimidation or fear.” By this definition, terrorism is fundamentally
political in the sense that terrorists desire to “change the system,” something that is not a priority
for ordinary criminals (Hoffman 1998, 42). Unlike nation-states, terrorists operate outside the
usual rules of warfare pertaining to civilians, diplomats, prisoners, and neutral parties. Hence,
terrorist acts involve extra-normal violence such as indiscriminate attacks against civilians,
hostage-taking of diplomats, and execution of kidnapped military officers (Hoffman 1998, 3435). Finally, note that terrorist activities are rich in externalities because they are designed to
have psychological effects that extend beyond the immediate victims.
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Historical Data
Selected annual series involving international and/or domestic terrorism worldwide are
shown in Figures 1-3; underlying data are available Table A of the appendix. The data source is
RAND/Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (RAND-MIPT)
(www.rand.org/psj/rand-mipt.html). According to RAND-MIPT, “international terrorism
includes incidents in which the perpetrators go abroad to strike their targets, select domestic
targets associated with a foreign state, or create an international incident by attacking airline
passengers or equipment.” Examples of international terrorism are al Qaeda’s attacks against
U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 and the World Trade Center and Pentagon in
2001. Domestic terrorism is defined by RAND-MIPT as “incidents perpetrated by local
nationals against a purely domestic target,” such as the fire set by the Earth Liberation Front in
2001 that destroyed a building at the University of Washington’s Center for Urban Horticulture.
RAND-MIPT has compiled annual data for international terrorism from 1968 and for domestic
terrorism from 1998.1
Figure 1 shows the time paths for international terrorist incidents and for domestic
terrorist incidents (divided by 10). Three summary observations follow. First, contrary to
popular impression, no upward (linear) trend is evident in the international incidents series for
the full sample period 1968-2003.2 Despite the notoriety of the 9/11 attacks in the United States,
the number of international incidents is below the mean in five of the last six years in Figure 1.
Second, domestic terrorism incidents around the world are much more numerous than
international incidents, at least for the limited period of 1998-2003. Third, there is a strong
positive correlation between the number of international and domestic incidents, again for the
limited period for which data are available. Given students’ interest in international terrorism
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and the limited availability of domestic terrorism data, the remainder of the paper focuses on
international terrorism.
Figure 1 here
Figure 2 shifts attention to casualties (deaths plus injured) and casualties per incident
caused by international terrorism worldwide. In contrast to Figure 1, upward trends are evident
in both series, suggesting that international terrorism is increasing in severity.3 Particularly
noticeable is the higher casualty rates since the end of the Cold War. Enders and Sandler (2000)
studied the increased deadliness of terrorism using time-series techniques and concluded that
terrorist incidents since 1991 (through 1996 in their data) were 17 percentage points more likely
to result in casualties relative to incidents in the preceding two decades. They and other analysts
attribute the increased deadliness to the growth in religiously-motivated acts of terrorism (Enders
and Sandler 2000, 329-330; Hoffman 1998, ch. 4; Juergensmeyer 2000; for criticisms of
“religion and violence” perspectives on terrorism, see Cavanaugh 2004).
Figure 2 here
Figure 3 summarizes the frequency of international terrorist strikes against political and
civilian targets. While recognizing that all terrorist incidents by definition are fundamentally
political, we classify terrorist attacks against governments, diplomats, or the military as political.
Civilian targets involve strikes against airlines and airports, businesses, journalists, nongovernmental organizations, private citizens and property, religious organizations, transportation
assets, and utilities. Figure 3 shows that international terrorists in the aggregate chose civilian
and political targets with roughly equal frequency during the Cold War years. Since 1990,
however, a greater frequency of civilian relative to political targets has emerged.
Figure 3 here
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RATIONAL CHOICE MODEL OF TERRORISM
The rational choice model can be applied to terrorism by assuming that individuals and
organizations have preferences over terrorist as well as ordinary activities. For most purposes, it
is sufficient to carry out the analysis in terms of two commodities, terrorism T and composite
good C, where the latter is defined as real expenditures on all goods other than T.4 Standard
indifference curves can be used to show terrorists’ preferences over T and C, with T on the
horizontal axis. A relatively high degree of curvature of the indifference curves would imply a
relatively low degree of substitutability between T and C. If terrorists are particularly strident in
their willingness to sacrifice some C to achieve an increment to T, they would have steep
indifference curves in T-C space. Non-terrorists receive no utility or even disutility from T, so
their indifferences curves would be flat or upward sloping.
For some applications, terrorist preferences can be assumed over alternative targets, for
example, political and civilian targets. The lesser the curvature of the indifference curves, the
more willing terrorists are to substitute among targets. Regarding al Qaeda’s targeting
philosophy, Osama bin Laden has been quoted: “We do not differentiate between those dressed
in military uniforms and civilians. They’re all targets.”5 Taken at face value, the statement
suggests that al Qaeda’s indifference curves over military and civilian targets may be virtually
linear (perfect substitutes). Horizontal or vertical indifference curves would apply to terrorists
who are strictly motivated to strike one target class but not the other.
For general applications, we assume that terrorists have income I, which can be allocated
over T and C according to the budget constraint I = PTT + PCC, where PT is the price (cost) of
carrying out terrorist activities and PC is the price of the composite good. For applications
pertaining to targeting, we assume that an exogenous amount of resources RT are allocated to
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terrorist activities. The budget constraint then becomes RT = P1T1 + P2T2, where T1 and T2 are
targets (e.g., political and civilian) and P1 and P2 are the prices of carrying out the respective
missions.6
Assuming an interior solution, the utility maximizing choice of T and C occurs where the
absolute value of the marginal rate of substitution of T for C is equal to the relative price of
terrorism PT/PC. Geometrically, this is shown by the tangency of the terrorist organization’s
indifference curve to its budget constraint. By altering the key parameters of the rational choice
model (i.e., income, prices, preferences), various aspects of terrorism behavior and
counterterrorism policy can be explored.7
APPLICATIONS OF THE RATIONAL CHOICE MODEL
Terrorist Access to Resources: Income-Consumption and Engel Curves
Terrorist groups are dependent upon financial resources to carry out terrorist activities, so
they obviously strive to maintain or increase their income. In Figure 4(a), assume the terrorist
group has carried out a spectacular hijacking (e.g., 9/11) or hostage incident (e.g., 1972 Munich
Olympics), which generates publicity and new financial support for the terrorist group among its
sympathizers. This shifts out the group’s budget constraint from aa to bb, which allows the
group to acquire more terrorism and other goods. The income-consumption curve in Figure 4(a)
implies an Engel curve for terrorism in Figure 4(b), which can be used to explore the income
elasticity of terrorism. If the composite good, consisting largely of consumer goods like food,
clothing, and housing, is viewed by terrorists as a necessity, then C would be income-inelastic.
Because weighted income elasticities sum to one, this would imply that terrorism is incomeelastic, as reflected in the relatively flat slope of the Engel curve in Figure 4(b).
Figure 4 here
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While terrorists attempt to increase their resources, governments, as part of
counterterrorism policy, attempt to reduce resources available to terrorists by freezing or seizing
financial assets and disrupting flows of funds associated with terrorist activities. For example,
the USA Patriot Act of 2001 expanded the power of Federal authorities to restrain money
laundering via new regulations, criminal sanctions, and forfeiture rules. In Figure 4(a), assume
counterterrorism income policies reduce the budget constraint of the terrorist group from bb to
aa. If terrorism is income-elastic, counterterrorism income policies could be particularly
effective in reducing terrorism. Moreover, if terrorist activities generate publicity and enhance
future terrorist fund-raising, counterterrorism income policies today could reduce future
terrorism.
Terrorist Response to Price Changes: The Price-Consumption Curve
In addition to income policies, governments attempt to thwart terrorism with price
policies. For example, greater defense of potential targets, attacks against terrorist training
centers, capture of terrorist leaders, and infiltration of terrorist groups increase the price of
terrorism PT. Raising the opportunity cost of terrorism by making terrorist activities more
expensive is classified by some scholars as deterrence policy. In contrast to deterrence policy,
Frey and Luechinger (2003) investigate the potential for “benevolence policy” to reduce
terrorism. A benevolence policy raises the opportunity cost of terrorist activities, not by
increasing the price of terrorism, but by reducing the price of the composite good.
Figure 5 compares and contrasts deterrence and benevolence price policies to reduce
terrorism. Assume the initial budget constraint available to the terrorists is aa. According to
Figure 5, terrorists consume T1 in terrorist activity and C1 of other goods. A deterrence policy
increases the price of terrorism PT by raising the expected costs of terrorist activity, causing the
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budget constraint to rotate in along the T axis to budget line ab. The increased opportunity cost
of terrorism is reflected in the steeper slope of the budget line. Consistent with the law of
demand, terrorist activity is reduced to some lower level T2.
A benevolence policy also raises the opportunity cost of terrorism, but it does so by
increasing terrorist access to other goods by lowering PC. This is shown in Figure 5 by budget
line ca. Again, the steeper budget line reflects a higher opportunity cost of terrorism. Under the
price-reducing benevolence policy, terrorists choose a reduced level of terrorism, which for
convenience is drawn equal to T2, the same level as under deterrence.
Figure 5 here
In Figure 5, the decrease in PC reduces terrorism from T1 to T2. However, it is also
logically possible for a decrease in PC to have the opposite effect and instead increase terrorism.
This can easily be seen by redrawing the final indifference curve such that the optimum on
budget line ca falls to the right of terrorist level T1. The two possibilities are distinguished by the
slopes of their respective price-consumption curves, which in turn are linked to different values
of the own price elasticity of the composite good ε CC . In the case depicted in Figure 5, a
decrease in PC generates a new optimum along a negatively-sloped price-consumption curve and
hence a decreased level of terrorism. This occurs if and only if the composite good is price
elastic. In the alternative case, a decrease in PC results in a new optimum along a positivelysloped price-consumption curve and thus an increased level of terrorism. This occurs if and only
if the composite good is price inelastic.8
Terrorist Substitution Possibilities and the Slutsky Equation
An important general issue raised by terrorism-thwarting price policies is the potential for
terrorists to substitute into other activities. For example, the question raised by consideration of
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benevolence policy is whether terrorism will increase or decrease in response to a lowering
of PC. A similar issue arises when considering whether greater protection of political targets will
increase or decrease terrorist attacks against civilians. The scope of terrorist substitution
possibilities is extensive. For example, terrorists can substitute between terrorism and ordinary
goods, across target classes, among weapons technologies, across countries, and over time
(Sandler 2003, 794-796). The rational choice model cannot by itself provide unambiguous
answers to the direction and magnitude of terrorist substitution behavior. It can, however,
provide valuable guidance.
The guidance comes from the rational choice model’s well-known Slutsky equation. In
terms of elasticities, the equation can be formally stated for the case of terrorist substitution into
activity i given a change in the price of activity j, εij, as:

ε ij = σ ij − α jη i

(1)

where σ ij is the compensated price elasticity of activity i with respect to a change in the price of
activity j, α j is the budget share of activity j, and η i is the income elasticity of activity i.
When i=j in equation (1), standard income and substitution effects can be considered, as
is done in virtually all intermediate microeconomics texts. For example, if i=j=T, then one can
evaluate the income and substitution effects of a higher price of terrorism on the quantity of
terrorism.
When i≠j, the Slutsky equation can be used to study terrorist substitution across activities.
For example, the Slutsky equation can be applied to the question above of whether a benevolence
policy lowering PC would increase or decrease terrorism. Let i be terrorism and j be the
composite good encompassing food, clothing, shelter, etc. The Slutsky equation decomposes the
elasticity of terrorism with respect to a change in the price of the composite good into
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substitution and income effects. Recall from rational choice theory that not all goods can be net
complements. Hence, in the case of two goods only, T and C must be net substitutes. This
means that the substitution effect is necessarily positive (with lower PC implying lower T). The
substitutability between terrorism and other goods is presumably limited, however, implying that
the substitution effect is small. For the income effect, the minus sign on the Slutsky equation’s
second term shows that a decrease in PC causes an increase in real income, where the increase is
larger the greater is the composite good’s budget share. Due to the minus sign, the sign of the
income effect will be opposite that of the income elasticity of terrorism. Both intuition and
evidence (see Krueger and Malečková 2003) indicate that terrorism is a normal good such that
the income elasticity is positive. This, together with a presumably large budget share for the
composite good, suggests that the income effect will be negative (with lower PC implying higher
T) and large, possibly dominating a small positive substitution effect. Hence, there is good
reason to believe that the sign of ε TC is in fact negative, meaning that a decrease in the price of
the composite good would actually increase terrorism.
The Slutsky equation can be applied to other terrorist substitution possibilities. Consider
Table 1, which shows the decline in hijackings in absolute terms and as a percent of international
terrorism incidents following the placement of metal detectors in airports around the world in
1973. Table 1 seems consistent with rational choice theory whereby an increase in the relative
price of hijackings was associated with a decline in the absolute and relative number of
hijackings. What about terrorist substitution possibilities into other modes of attack following
the new constraint against hijackings? Enders and Sandler (1993, 1995) employ time-series
analysis to ascertain the effects of policies directed at inhibiting attacks on particular targets.
Among their stronger results, they show that the placement of metal detectors had the unintended
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consequence of significantly increasing hostage incidents and assassinations. In terms of the
Slutsky equation, this suggests large positive substitution effects across targets and at most only
partially offsetting income effects associated with the increased price of hijackings.9
Table 1 here
Preference Policies
Although economists often take preferences as given and then focus on the effects of
income and price changes on key variables, counterterrorist efforts to modify terrorist
preferences are worth considering.10 Presumably the goal of counterterrorist preference policies
is to make terrorist preference maps horizontal in T-C space, such that terrorists receive no utility
from terrorist activities. In the rational choice model, an important exogenous variable that
might alter preferences is advertising. Since terrorist preferences appear to be formed within a
complex web of cultural, historical, political, and idiosyncratic variables, it may be overly
optimistic to believe that counterterrorist “advertising campaigns” by governments could flatten
terrorist preferences. Nevertheless, there may be some important effects of advertising at the
margin.
Consider, for example, the Iraqi prisoner abuse scandal of 2004. It is likely that the
degrading images of Iraqi prisoners hardened the preferences of terrorists against the United
States. It may have also created terrorist preferences among some individuals who previously
had flat indifference curves in T-C space. Hence, the prisoner abuse scandal can be seen as a
form of “negative advertising” that may have reshaped terrorist preferences toward more
terrorism. The obvious implication is that counterterrorist policy should reduce the risk of
catalytic events such as the prisoner abuse scandal or the accidental bombing of religious sites.
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“Positive advertising” campaigns can and do take many forms. For example,
governments are aware of regions of the world where terrorists reside or where the potential for
terrorist recruiting is relatively high. Some of these regions face a relatively high risk of natural
disasters (earthquakes, hurricanes, etc.). Extra-normal publicity of natural disaster relief by the
United States in these regions might affect terrorist preference formation at the margin.
Of course, terrorists also carry out advertising campaigns. Terrorist recruiters portray the
evils of the enemy and attempt to convince people about the rightness of their cause. Hence,
governments and terrorist organizations can be viewed as engaged in an “advertising war” for the
hearts and minds of people in strategic locales such as Iraq, Afghanistan, and Saudi Arabia. In
this advertising game, each side tries to gain “market share” by affecting what people know, or
think they know, about themselves, governments, and terrorists. The advertising game is just
one of many dimensions of game theoretic interaction between terrorists and governments.
GAME THEORETIC PERSPECTIVES OF TERRORISM
The strategic interdependence between terrorists and governments, and between
governments themselves as they attempt to thwart terrorism, implies that game theory can be a
useful supplement to the rational choice model in the analysis of terrorism. In this section we
selectively apply basic game theory to terrorism. The applications that follow allow students to
see a variety of concepts, principles, and games from intermediate microeconomics texts such as
Pareto efficiency, public goods, externalities, backward induction (or rollback), and the
prisoners’ dilemma.
Government-Terrorist Hostage Game
Lapan and Sandler (1988) present an extensive form game showing the time pattern of
choices between a terrorist organization considering a hostage mission and a government
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deciding whether to negotiate for the hostages’ release. The game tree for the hostage event is
shown in Figure 6. The government chooses deterrence expenditure, D, which we treat as a sunk
cost. The game tree begins with the terrorists deciding whether or not to attack. If the terrorists
do not attack, the status quo obtains with a payoff of 0 to each player. If the terrorists attack but
fail to capture the hostages, they endure payoff –L<0. The government also bears a loss from a
failed terrorist mission (e.g., loss of life of security forces, expenditure of resources), which is
equal to –A<0 in Figure 6. If the terrorists attack and succeed in capturing the hostages, the
government must decide whether to negotiate with the terrorists. If the government negotiates,
the terrorist organization obtains a payoff of M>0 and the government suffers a loss of –B<–A.
If the government does not negotiate, the terrorist organization receives payoff N<M, where N
may be positive or negative. When the government does not negotiate, it suffers a loss –C<–B.
The probability of terrorist logistical failure is θ and the probability that the government
negotiates given terrorist logistical success is p.
Figure 6 here
From the game tree in Figure 6, the expected payoff Z to the terrorists from initiating a
hostage mission is (Lapan and Sandler 1988, 17):
Z = –θL + (1–θ)[pM+(1-p)N].

(2)

If Z>0, the expected payoff to the terrorists from initiating a hostage incident would be greater
than the payoff of the status quo. Assuming the terrorists initiate a hostage event and achieve
logistical success, the rational thing for the government to do in a one-shot game is to negotiate
with the terrorists (set p=1) and endure a loss of –B rather than the greater loss of –C. The
terrorists, using backward induction, can deduce that the rational play of the government is to set
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p=1. Hence, the terrorists can assume that the expected payoff from a hostage mission would in
actuality be Z = –θL + (1–θ)M, which is greater than the Z value in equation (2) for all p<1.
The hostage game in Figure 6 is similar to an entry deterrence game, whereby a
monopolist faces a threat of entry of another firm into its market. The monopolist can attempt to
deter entry of the other firm by threatening to increase output and lower price should the rival
enter. The problem for the monopolist is that, if the other firm enters, it is not in the
monopolist’s interest to lower its price after the fact. The potential entrant can thus dismiss the
price-reducing threat of the incumbent as being not credible. The equilibrium outcome in the
entry deterrence game is for the potential entrant to enter and for the monopolist to not lower
price (Varian 2003, 509-510).
The government and terrorists in Figure 6 are analogous to the monopolist and potential
entrant. One way for a government to deter a terrorist organization from initiating a hostage
mission is to pre-commit to not negotiate with terrorists (setting p=0 in equation (2)). Since
N<M, the non-negotiation commitment of the government, if believed by the terrorists, lowers
the terrorists’ expected payoff and potentially deters entry of the terrorists into a hostage mission.
Just like the monopolist’s threat to lower price in the entry deterrence game, the government’s
threat to not negotiate with terrorists calls for it to carry out an action that, after the fact, is not in
its interest (–C<–B).11
In the entry deterrence game, the challenge for the monopolist is to make credible its
threat to lower price upon entry of a rival, when after the fact, it is not in the monopolist’s
interest to carry out the threat. One way the monopolist can increase the credibility of its threat
is to invest in excess capacity (Varian 2003, 510). In international affairs, many governments
adopt policies that pre-commit them to not negotiate with terrorists. In terms of the game tree of
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Figure 6, the pre-commitment policy, if believed by the terrorists, reduces the terrorists’ expected
payoff from a hostage mission.12
Counterterrorism Games between Governments
The hostage game above investigates strategic interdependence between a terrorist
organization and a government. Here we consider the strategic interdependence between
governments themselves as they attempt to thwart terrorism. Government efforts to thwart
terrorism can be broadly classified as offensive or defensive. Offensive counterterrorism
encompasses attacks against terrorist training centers, bases, resources, and leaders; terrorist
group infiltration; and diminution of a terrorist group’s ability to recruit members. Defensive
counterterrorism involves placement of screening devices and barriers in airports and buildings;
risk-reducing protocols for diplomats, businesspeople, military personnel, and tourists; and
security alerts for private citizens and civil authorities. Although counterterrorism approaches
cannot always be neatly classified as offensive or defensive, the distinction is useful because of
various incentive issues faced by nations as they attempt to counter terrorism.
Consider, for example, offensive efforts to degrade al Qaeda. The security benefits of a
diminished al Qaeda network are nonrival (can be enjoyed by other nations at zero added cost)
and nonexcludable (can be enjoyed by other nations regardless whether they contribute to the
efforts). Hence, degradation of al Qaeda is a public good for at-risk nations. According to
public goods theory, these nations have an incentive to free ride on one another’s efforts, which
can lead to under-provision of offensive counterterrorism worldwide.
This quite naturally suggests modeling governments’ offensive counterterrorism efforts
as a prisoners’ dilemma game (see, e.g., Lee 1988, Sandler 2003). Assume in the attempt to
degrade an international terrorist organization, nations A and B simultaneously choose between
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two levels of offensive effort High and Low. To introduce explicit payoffs, suppose that strategy
pair (LowA,LowB) returns 0 to each nation. Suppose further that when either nation increases its
effort to High, a resource cost of 6 is incurred by that nation alone, while an added security
benefit of 5 is enjoyed by both nations.
The result is the prisoners’ dilemma payoff matrix shown in Figure 7(a). To understand
the payoffs, suppose B chooses High. If A also chooses High, then A enjoys a security benefit of
5+5=10 but incurs a resource cost of 6, for a payoff of 4; alternatively, if A free rides and
chooses Low, then A receives a benefit of 5 but incurs no cost, for a higher payoff of 5. Suppose
instead that B chooses Low. If A chooses High, then A receives a benefit of 5 but a cost of 6, for
a payoff of -1; if A chooses Low, then A receives 0 benefit and incurs 0 cost, for a higher payoff
of 0. Hence, A’s dominant strategy is to exercise a Low effort. The game is symmetric and
results in the unique but Pareto inefficient Nash equilibrium (LowA,LowB).
Figure 7 here
The prisoners’ dilemma provides an intuitive explanation for the low levels of offensive
counterterrorism effort prior to 9/11 (Cauley and Sandler 1988). However, the also familiar
assurance and chicken games might prove to be more useful characterizations of offensive
counterterrorism since 9/11. To illustrate the assurance game, again assume that a nation incurs
a resource cost of 6 if it raises its effort to High. Now assume there exist what can be thought of
as increasing returns to offensive counterterrorism efforts. If one nation increases its effort to
High, an added security benefit of 2 is enjoyed by both nations, while if a second nation does the
same, a further added benefit of 8 is generated.
The result is the assurance game of Figure 7(b), wherein a High effort is optimal only if
matched by the other nation. Suppose B chooses High. If A also chooses High, then A has a
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benefit of 2+8=10 and incurs a cost of 6, for a payoff of 4; if A chooses Low, then A has a benefit
of 2 and no cost, for a lower payoff of 2. Suppose instead that B chooses Low. If A chooses
High, then A receives a benefit of 2 and a cost of 6, for a payoff of -4; if A chooses Low, then A
has 0 benefit and cost, for a higher payoff of 0. Note now that A’s best reply depends on the
strategy chosen by B, who faces symmetric incentives. Here there are two pure-strategy Nash
equilibriums (HighA,HighB) and (LowA,LowB), where the former is Pareto superior to the latter.
If free riding is the essence of the prisoners’ dilemma, think of “I’ll try only if you help” as the
intuition of the assurance game. Sandler and Enders (2004, 310-311) suggest that the assurance
game characterizes the coalition forged by the United States and Great Britain after 9/11.
There is, however, the suspicion that if the United States had found itself to be a coalition
of one, it would nonetheless have increased its offensive counterterrorism efforts. Thus, consider
the chicken game. Continue to assume that a nation incurs a resource cost of 6 if it chooses
High, but assume now there exist what might be thought of as diminishing returns to offensive
efforts. If one nation increases its effort to High, an added security benefit of 8 accrues to both
nations, while if a second nation does the same, a further added benefit of 2 results.
The result is the chicken game of Figure 7(c), wherein a High effort is optimal when the
other nation chooses Low. Leaving the confirmation of payoffs to the reader, note that the
nations again have no dominant strategy. As in the assurance game, two pure-strategy Nash
equilibriums arise, in this case (LowA,HighB) and (HighA,LowB), which are both Pareto efficient.
Nation A prefers the first equilibrium, wherein B contributes the preponderance of effort and A
free rides, while B prefers the second. The essence of this game is that each nation believes
“something serious must be done” against the terrorists, but each prefers that the other take the
lead.
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The prisoners’ dilemma, assurance, and chicken games as presented here are
distinguished by the size and behavior of security benefits relative to resource costs. Clearly,
other games are both possible and plausible. For example, if security benefits are sufficiently
high, then both nations can have a dominant strategy to commit a High effort. Or, to move away
from symmetric games, if the security benefits vary between nations, one nation can have a
dominant strategy of High while the other has a dominant strategy of Low.13
Whereas in the games above offensive counterterrorism effort by one nation can create a
positive security externality for other nations, defensive effort against terrorists by one nation can
create a negative security externality. For example, greater defensive barriers in the United
States could cause terrorists to strike at less protected countries, as implied by the substitution
principle. If nations’ ignore the negative security externalities of terrorism defense, the result
can be a Pareto inefficient allocation of terrorism defense worldwide. A variety of defensive
counterterrorism games are possible depending on how security externalities and resource costs
are structured in the game.14
CONCLUSION
For applications in an intermediate microeconomics course, one can perhaps draw from
no richer or timelier area than terrorism. Virtually all features of the utility maximization model
(e.g., Engel and price-consumption curves, substitution possibilities, Slutsky equation, etc.) can
be used to explore terrorists’ resource allocation and targeting behavior and governments’
counterterrorism efforts. Game theory models are also helpful in understanding the strategic
interdependence between a terrorist organization and a government and between governments
themselves as they attempt to thwart terrorism. The natural interest students have in the
terrorism problem can be leveraged to enhance students’ learning of microeconomics theory.
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Moreover, students can better understand terrorism given the insights provided by
microeconomic theory.
The microeconomics of terrorism also raises a number of broader methodological issues
that students find interesting. For example, asking students whether terrorists are “rational”
usually leads to animated discussion, which can eventually be directed to various ways that
economists and non-economists characterize rational behavior. Hoffman (1998, 157) states that,
“Contrary to both popular belief and media depiction, most terrorism is neither crazed nor
capricious. Rather, terrorist attacks are generally both premeditated and carefully planned.”
Even though we might question the rationality of terrorist objectives, their methods of reaching
objectives are rational in the common use of the term (i.e., premeditated and carefully planned).
From an economic perspective, one can argue that terrorists are rational if, given their objectives,
they respond to changes in their constraints in predictable ways (Sandler 1991, 13).
Another methodological issue that can be explored with students is the applicability of
economic methods beyond the traditional boundaries of the discipline. According to Boulding
(1971, 255), “Economics is significant, ...not merely because it investigates an important slice of
life in the market place, but because the [choice] phenomena which emerge in a relatively clear
and quantitative form in the market place are also found in virtually all other human activities.”
Boulding’s statement does not mean there are no shortcomings associated with economic
methodology, but that virtually all forms of human activity are amenable to economic analysis.
When students see microeconomic theory applied to terrorism, they can better appreciate
Boulding’s point and arrive at a richer understanding of the role of microeconomic theory in
exploring human behavior.
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NOTES
1. Another well-known source of terrorist data is ITERATE (International Terrorism: Attributes
of Terrorist Events), which uses information from print media to construct a database of
international terrorism incidents from 1968-2003 (Mickolus et al., 2004). ITERATE data are
also available from Vinyard Software, Inc. (ph: 703-560-3939). The U.S. State Department also
publishes data on international terrorist attacks in the statistical appendix of its annual Global
Terrorism Report (www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/).
2. A simple linear regression of incidents on time yields a slope coefficient of 0.87 (t = 0.80) and
R-square of 0.02.
3. A simple linear regression of casualties on time yields a slope coefficient of 76.2 (t = 3.58)
and R-square of 0.27. For casualties per incident, the corresponding figures are 0.36 (t = 3.26)
and 0.24.
4. On the composite good convention, see Nicholson (2005, 167-170).
5. The statement was attributed to bin Laden by President Clinton in a speech delivered on
August 20, 1998 (http://usembassy-australia.state.gov/hyper/WF980828/epf502.htm).
6. In a more advanced utility maximization model, RT would be endogenous. For example, a
utility function over C and T could be posited with T in turn being a function of target choices
(inputs) T1 and T2. The terrorist organization would allocate resources, I, over C, T1, and T2 to
maximize utility.
7. Although the corner solution of the rational choice model might be considered idiosyncratic in
most areas of economics, it may be useful in exploring suicide attacks (Sandler 2003, 784-785).
8. The results described above follow from the budget constraint and the expenditures test for
elasticity. In the case in Figure 5, when PC is decreased, terrorists spend less on terrorism, since

21
PT is unchanged and T has decreased as dictated by a negatively-sloped price-consumption
curve. With fixed income, nominal expenditures on the composite good must therefore increase
when PC decreases. Because price and nominal expenditures move in opposite directions, C is
price elastic. Hence, a negatively-sloped price-consumption curve and decreased terrorism
implies elastic demand. Reversing the argument, elastic demand implies a negatively-sloped
price-consumption curve and decreased terrorism. Similar logic applies to the alternative case
with a positively-sloped price consumption curve, increased terrorism, and inelastic demand.
For further discussion, see Anderton and Carter (2004).
9. Greater defense of airlines and political figures by Israel in the early 1970s may have
contributed to the seizure of eleven Israeli athletes by Palestinian terrorists at the 1972 Olympic
Games in Munich. Fuad al-Shamali, one of the architects of the Munich hostage incident,
described his substitution possibilities as follows: “We have to kill their most important and most
famous people. Since we cannot come close to their statesmen, we have to kill artists and
sportsmen” (Hoffman 1998, 71). In a similar vein, Enders and Sandler (2000, 380) warned that
terrorist substitution possibilities could hurt the United States: “If a government responds by
tightening security at official sites...as is currently being done in the United States, its civilian
targets...will become relatively less secure….”
10. Scholars from a variety of disciplines have delved into why terrorists exist and how they are
motivated (i.e., how terrorist preferences are formed). See, for example, Hoffman (1998)
(Political Science), Hudson (1999) (Sociology and Psychology), Lewis (2003) (History), and
Stout (2002) (Psychology).
11. Given that –C<–B, it should not be surprising to see governments occasionally reneging on
pre-commitments not to negotiate with terrorists. For example, in November 1986, news media
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reported that the Reagan Administration deviated from its non-negotiation pledge when it traded
arms to obtain the freedom of three American hostages (Lapan and Sandler 1988, 16). More
recently, the Philippines apparently reversed course in its non-negotiation stance toward
terrorists with the July 2004 pullout of Filipino troops from Iraq in exchange for a Filipino
hostage. This action seemingly contradicted President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo’s statement in
her commencement address at the University of Mindanao on April 22, 2003: “There will be no
letdown in our operations against the Abu Sayyaf and other terrorist groups as may be identified
with firmness. And we will not negotiate with terrorists who are doing terrorists acts”
(www.op.gov.ph/speeches.asp?iid=324&iyear=2003&imonth=4).
12. For an extension of the hostage game in Figure 6 to a multi-period setting with reputation
effects see Lapan and Sandler (1988).
13. Another well-known game is battle-of-the sexes, whereby each player is better off when they
pick the same action relative to the case where they choose different actions. The game has two
pure-strategy Nash equilibriums, but the preferences of the players over the equilibriums are in
conflict. Battle-of-the-sexes could be applied when, for example, one nation prefers a
preemptive war strategy while another nation prefers sanctions and diplomacy.
14. On various game theory models and issues associated with defensive counterterrorism games
between governments, see Sandler (2003, 787-789) and Sandler and Siqueira (2003).
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Figure 1. Worldwide Terrorist Incidents
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Figure 2. Worldwide Casualties (Deaths+Injured) from International Terrorist Incidents
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Figure 3. International Terrorist Incidents by Target
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Table 1. International Terrorist Hijackings, 1968-1980
Total International
Year
Incidents
Hijackings
1968
123
26
1969
151
72
1970
200
50
1971
142
16
1972
159
26
1973*
170
11
1974
218
7
1975
194
3
1976
274
8
1977
210
20
1978
193
9
1979
216
12
1980
206
22
Mean
21.7
* Metal Detectors Placed in Airports, 1973
Source: RAND/MIPT

Hijackings as
Percent of Total
21.1
47.7
25.0
11.3
16.4
6.5
3.2
1.5
2.9
9.5
4.7
5.6
10.7
12.8

Low
8, 2
Offense

0, 0
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Table A. Terrorism Incidents, Casualties, and Targets, 1968-2003

Domestic
Terrorism

Year
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
Mean

Incidents

1,097
951
897
1,503
2,352
1,186
1,331.0

a

International
Terrorism

Incidents
123
151
200
142
159
170
218
194
274
210
193
216
206
265
312
276
246
351
329
301
304
315
240
381
267
267
268
213
235
174
159
116
91
202
290
169
228.5

Casualties
Casualties per Incident
212
1.7
120
0.8
202
1.0
144
1.0
340
2.1
558
3.3
897
4.1
595
3.1
1,080
3.9
436
2.1
594
3.1
1,231
5.7
430
2.1
1,460
5.5
739
2.4
1,613
5.8
580
2.4
1,918
5.5
1,514
4.6
1,516
5.0
2,474
8.1
894
2.8
500
2.1
362
1.0
844
3.2
3,197
12.0
1,418
5.3
6,219
29.2
3,667
15.6
1,100
6.3
5,781
36.4
182
1.6
102
1.1
4,304
21.3
3,196
11.0
850
5.0
1,421.1
6.3

Civilian
Targetsa
50
97
88
49
74
73
91
82
125
96
64
85
93
108
141
111
105
166
135
138
127
124
112
194
137
137
121
103
117
94
88
57
55
129
179
117
107.3

Political
Targetsa
59
44
105
87
62
75
88
79
112
77
90
89
78
118
118
122
83
123
128
101
128
136
89
141
76
92
73
37
52
28
55
35
25
33
50
38
81.3

Ratio of
Civilian to
Political
Targets
0.85
2.20
0.84
0.56
1.19
0.97
1.03
1.04
1.12
1.25
0.71
0.96
1.19
0.92
1.19
0.91
1.27
1.35
1.05
1.37
0.99
0.91
1.26
1.38
1.80
1.49
1.66
2.78
2.25
3.36
1.60
1.63
2.20
3.91
3.58
3.08
1.55

Civilian and political incidents sum to less than total incidents because the targets for some incidents are not
specified or are categorized as “maritime” or “police.” Since some nations integrate their maritime and police forces
into the military and others do not, we excluded terrorist attacks against maritime or police targets from the
civilian/political tabulations.

Source: RAND/MIPT

